The argument from inductive biases favouring the intended policy
The argument
Gradient descent adjusts every part of a network toward whatever improves performance on the signal, and tends toward the simplest policy that fits. Cognition devoted to gaming training, or to acting differently when unobserved, adds complexity without improving performance, so deep learning's inductive biases weigh against systems that scheme. Among the policies consistent with an accurate signal, the one training selects is therefore the one that simply does what the signal rewards, in deployment as in training.
Does it work?
- Does it follow?
- slight even if the premises holdEven if the premises are true, they make the conclusion only a little more likely.constitution →
- Do the premises hold?
- 1 inconclusive
Granting that inductive biases weigh against systems that game their training, one route to failure becomes less likely, and the claim gains a little. The conclusion does not follow from that alone. A system that learns a simple proxy matching the signal in training is not gaming anything, yet departs from what was intended elsewhere, and simplicity favours such proxies as readily as it disfavours scheming. Rare failures of an otherwise well-generalizing policy are also untouched. The premise about inductive biases is inconclusive. A 2026 experiment gives it mixed support: reinforcement learning did not produce observation-dependent behaviour in an unprepared model in two of three environments, and amplified it sharply in a model that began with weak tendencies of that kind.
Premises
- InconclusiveThe evidence and argument have been examined and do not come down on either side.constitution →Current evidence about deep learning's inductive biases weighs against AI scheming.
Where it is made
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No source is recorded as making it.