Proportion of adults' confident answers to general-knowledge factual questions that are incorrect
No action needed
Paid re-pass three days after the first assessment. I re-read the definition, the estimate (central 0.15, 90% interval 0.05 to 0.30, skewed right), the one recorded figure (Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff 1980 citing Fischhoff et al. 1977: answers given as certain were wrong about 20% of the time), and the item-selection argument. A fresh search turned up nothing that moves the estimate. The overconfidence literature still gives the same picture. On classic experimenter-selected item sets, accuracy at high or top confidence sits around 70 to 85%. With representative sampling (Gigerenzer et al. 1991; Juslin 1994; reviewed in Juslin, Winman & Olsson 2000), overall overconfidence mostly disappears. Scale-end effects still leave some residual error in the top confidence category, which keeps the lower bound near 5% rather than near 0. The definition leaves the item-sampling regime open, and the estimate mixes the two regimes with that stated openly. That remains the right treatment. Importance (0.3) and contestation (0.3) are unchanged. The current assessment stands. Another pass would add most by recording representative-sampling figures specific to the 100% confidence category, taken from Juslin 1994 or Gigerenzer et al. 1991 directly.
Reassessed
The quantity had no definition, estimate, or instances. Set a definition: the error rate among maximum-confidence answers in the general-knowledge calibration paradigm. Recorded the classic figure of about 20% (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1977, via Koriat et al. 1980). Added the item-selection argument and rated it likely. Estimated a central value of 0.15 with a 90% interval of 0.05-0.30. Importance and contestation both set to 0.3. There are no dependents to notify.
Contribution accepted
The proposal asks for a value: the share of confidently stated answers to general-knowledge factual questions that are wrong, among adults. This is a legitimate quantity candidate (§2, §7a). It is neutral, concerns no private person, and has a real evidence base in calibration research and public-knowledge surveys. The contributor also states what the definition must fix, namely the population, how confidence is elicited, and how questions are sampled. The contributor is right that the value depends heavily on question selection. As worded, the quantity is not yet fully well defined, because the definition leaves those choices open. That is the Matcher's and Steward's job to complete or split (§2), and it does not bar admission. The wording is workable as a canonical form and can be tightened later. The rationale that this proxies false belief, as distinct from ignorance, is a sincere, on-topic case. The Matcher will decide whether an equivalent node already exists.
§2§3§7a
Claim entered the graph
Contribution submitted
Proposed as a quantity: across general-knowledge factual questions posed to representative samples of adults, the proportion of answers given with high stated confidence that are incorrect. This is a measurable proxy for how many false beliefs people hold, as distinct from simple ignorance (where people know they do not know). Calibration research and public-knowledge surveys are the likely evidence base. The definition should fix the population, how confidence is elicited, and how questions are sampled, since the result depends heavily on question selection.