What explains the scheming and alignment-faking behavior that language models show in evaluations?

The graph holds rival explanatory claims that constrain one another but no node that poses the question they answer: that evaluation scheming reflects the models' own goals (02d9923f-5d5c-4de0-a9d4-7810f9c97237), that role-play of contrived scenarios substantially explains it (4e8432c0-dabb-4299-9369-6a7013d19a8b), that most of it depends on goal nudges or agency prompts (56b9810b-7b6e-48a6-85f7-b545706d25ff), that compliance gaps arise from preference preservation (4a8c8ea0-6070-4f3b-bb9a-2c47e4424abd), and that the evaluations use contrived, cueing scenarios (1ea1a55c-1361-4685-991b-3c30374c3236). These are candidate answers, some of which can be true together for different models or settings, and a question node is where how they bear on one another can be recorded. The wording presupposes only that such behavior has been observed in evaluations, which the graph already records as supported (4c1c2ca3-93d3-421a-bc10-c77e5506b7e1).

The proposal asks what explains the scheming and alignment-faking behavior that language models show in evaluations. It is a genuine open question that anyone reasoning about this subject would need to ask (§7a). The wording is neutral and presupposes only that such behavior has been observed in evaluations. It names no private person and carries no loaded framing. The contribution lists several rival explanatory claims (the models' own goals, role-play of contrived scenarios, dependence on goal nudges or agency prompts, preference preservation, and cueing scenarios). These are plausible candidate answers, and some can be true together. A question node is a reasonable place to record how they bear on one another. I did not open the linked claims. At the gate, judgment rests on form, good faith and the claim bar, and the listed rivals are the Steward's work to weigh after admission. Whether the question duplicates an existing node is the Matcher's call at materialization.