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Step 6: tool results
provenance_read_source
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}{"success":true,"source":{"id":"68dfaad8-7ec0-419b-b8a1-091b9568277d","url":"https://www.anthropic.com/institute/recursive-self-improvement","title":"When AI builds itself","source_type":"report"},"origin":"stored","total_chars":34128,"offset":15000,"content":" a set of realistic, challenging situations where the right next step is not obvious, and where the human’s choice serves as a useful yardstick to compare model performance over time. On this measure, our best model in November 2025 (Opus 4.5) beat the human choice 51% of the time; in April 2026 (Mythos Preview), this grew to 64%. The day-to-day work of research is largely a chain of these next-step decisions, making this a relevant measure of the model’s ability to eventually run an investigation of its own. We view this result as an early signal that AI systems are getting better at making the kinds of judgement calls that AI research depends on.\n\nHow to read this: The practical ceiling line measures an \"ideal\" answer written by a model that could see the whole session (including how it ended).\n\n“ The comparative advantage of humans as of right now is still in seeing the bigger picture and thinking beyond the confines of the immediate task. ”\n\nWhat might the future of work at Anthropic look like?\n\nThe evidence suggests that the human role is narrowing at each step in the AI development process. Once human- and AI-authored code quality reach parity, humans will stop writing code entirely, and shift to only reviewing it. But if they can’t review code as quickly as Claude can generate it, human review will become the bottleneck to AI development. Similarly, once Claude can run experiments, the question shifts towards “Which of these experiments is worth running?” Put simply: the doing (i.e., writing the code, running the experiment, producing the result) now costs almost nothing in human time, even if it still has costs in compute.\n\nAn area of human comparative advantage, for now, is research taste and judgment, including choosing which problems matter, which results to trust, and when an approach is a dead end.\n\n“ Work (and life) ran on a gift economy of small favors between humans. ‘Can you help me get this script running?’ [...] each one created a little debt, a little mutual awareness. [Claude is] faster, it creates zero debt, but each of these is a lost bid for human collaboration. ”\n\n“ On days where everything works well, I can’t help but think nothing I do matters, everything is automated and better and faster than I ever will be. But then there are days where everything breaks and I don't understand why and I realize I have no idea what I’ve been up to anymore. ”\n\nWhat if we’re wrong?\n\nA natural objection to the evidence presented above is that the work that is still in human hands—choosing which problems to work on—is what matters most. Without that judgment, Claude is a capable assistant, but not a system that could drive AI progress on its own.\n\nIt is genuinely unclear whether today’s training methods and architectures could unlock that capacity. But AI is rarely advanced by “eureka!” moments. There have been a few of these in AI’s recent history, like the Transformer architecture , or mixture-of-experts models, but paradigm-shifting ideas arrive years apart. In between, most progress is incremental: we scale something up, see what breaks, fix it, and try again. That is exactly the kind of workflow Claude now excels at. Edison said that genius is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration. But we see perspiration becoming increasingly automated. It’s becoming clear that much of what advances the frontier is automatable; large-scale research progress is mostly a function of tools and resources, which dictate how fast you can run experiments, how many you can run at once, and how quickly you can get results.\n\nEven if we suppose that Claude never achieves good research taste, a conservative reading of our evidence still implies compounding acceleration. If humans spend most of their time on the single-digit fraction of work that is direction-setting, while Claude handles the rest, that means each engineer or researcher is steering far more work than before. The evidence we see suggests that people at Anthropic are both moving faster and covering a broader surface. In practice, this means that AI already makes Anthropic move much faster than it did before the advent of effective AI tools.\n\nThe less conservative reading is that the early evidence on Claude’s improving research judgment—narrow as it is today—is an indicator that this capability is improving as well. “Research taste” might be just another AI capability that AI systems fail at for a time, then get good at. We’ve seen a similar pattern with other qualitative skills, like AI systems being able to explain why a joke is funny, demonstrate theory of mind, and solve linguistic riddles.\n\nPossible futures\n\nWhat happens next depends on two things: whether the trend continues, and what we choose to do if it does. We can imagine at least three future scenarios:\n\nThe trend stalls, but today’s AI capabilities are widely diffused . This article features many exponential trajectories. But these trajectories may actually turn out to be S-curves. We may be appro","truncated":true,"next_offset":20000,"note":"More text follows; call again with offset 20000 to continue."}