Step 15: assistant

Calls write_argument

{
  "content": "Any polynomial-size capability can be written as a feed-forward circuit whose weights are a finite message. Each weight matrix is locked in a digital locker keyed by a secret trigger of min-entropy at least the security parameter, and the locker evaluation (a hash and XOR) plus an execution unit are compiled into network weights. The compiled weights are a public polynomial-time function of the locker ciphertexts and public settings alone, so any polynomial-time white-box auditor that finds an unlocking input, or tells which of two equal-size payloads is embedded, yields an adversary with the same advantage against the lockers. Digital lockers secure in this sense exist in the random-oracle model (hash-based) and, under stronger assumptions, in the standard model. Hence no polynomial-time auditor can elicit or identify the hidden capability except with negligible probability, provided the compiled network executes the locker correctly and accepts no trigger the locker rejects.",
  "argument_id": "ec610556-ab82-4805-a87f-39605b4b615d"
}

Calls place_argument_passage

{
  "stance": "advances",
  "reading": "full",
  "argument_id": "ec610556-ab82-4805-a87f-39605b4b615d",
  "instance_id": "83a163d6-b7d3-44cb-a228-937217c2e192"
}

Calls place_argument_passage

{
  "stance": "advances",
  "reading": "premise_unstated",
  "argument_id": "ec610556-ab82-4805-a87f-39605b4b615d",
  "instance_id": "b5d31178-d8c3-4df5-8569-69e9e06aa576"
}