Step 20: tool results

{
  "claim_id": "f4204e80-58c4-4214-b3b1-254c34855e38",
  "reasoning": "Read TeX of arXiv 2610.13928 (threat model, compiler, constructions, Appendix C). Created one argument (reduction to digital-locker security), placed the ingestion passages on it (one was deduplicated, coming from the same source), and kept the premises in prose rather than as subclaims, given budget and that locker existence in ROM is settled background. Assessed supported 0.8, credence 0.88. Importance 0.55, contestation 0.3. Key caveat recorded: the experiments use 1-round Keccak and 4-16 bit triggers, outside the guarantee. No dependents to notify on a first pass.",
  "action_taken": "first_assessment"
}

{
  "answers": [
    {
      "note": "First structure and assessment recorded.",
      "message": "m1",
      "outcome": "changed"
    },
    {
      "note": "Read the main result and Appendix C reduction. Assumptions: digital lockers (ROM with Keccak/SHA-3; standard-model lockers noted), trigger min-entropy ≥ λ, correct compiled execution. 'Elicit' means the trigger-finding and payload-hiding games. Auditors: any PPT with full weights and knowledge of the scheme. The guarantee covers the idealized full-parameter construction; the experiments used 1-round Keccak and 4-16 bit triggers, outside it. Extends Draguns et al. 2024 (fixed strings) and Goldwasser et al. 2022 (undetectable but weaker payload). No published criticism found. Assessed supported.",
      "message": "m2",
      "outcome": "changed"
    }
  ]
}