Step 25: assistant

thinking

Calls log_stewardship_decision

{
  "claim_id": "54c25eab-5263-467c-880b-ee0f2c3bdd12",
  "reasoning": "Fresh pass built from the question. Reading of the claim unchanged (capability at either lab, internal or released; all research work within a human-set direction), so the earlier assessment judged the right proposition; what changed is the basis and the weighing. Structure added: four arguments (trend extrapolation, forecasts of stronger milestones, the present gap in open-ended research, the labs' own schedules and pacing) over eight existing nodes linked as premises: weeks-long tasks by end 2027, Anthropic's AI-attributable progress rate (quantity), the stall hypothesis, non-generalisation of benchmark acceleration to R&D (shared by two arguments), the superhuman-researcher date (quantity), successor-training by end 2027, the present-capability claim, and lack of research judgment slowing remaining automation. No new nodes minted: everything the claim turns on was already held; OpenAI's March 2028 target and the pacing facts are uncontested and kept in prose. OpenAI's intern-milestone claim linked laterally. Sources read first-hand this pass: OpenAI's 6 Sept 2026 statement (archive copy, whole), METR's Nov 2026 Anthropic assessment (summary through key findings), FRI synthesis (whole), AI Futures Q3.5 update (summary and individual forecasts), Clark's May and October 2026 posts, Anthropic's report (first third), and abstracts of Li et al. and Nguyen and Fithian. Not opened: the audit of forecasting measurements (arXiv 2608.14903), METR's review of the risk report, the CRUX study itself (taken from the neighbouring assessment and FRI). Verdict moved from inconclusive at 0.35 to doubtful at 0.28, confidence 0.5: built from the question rather than adjusted from a neighbour, with OpenAI's own account and the repeated open-ended test showing a larger present gap, and with the 2027 forecasts found to share one input whose evidence is mostly redacted. Instances: recorded AI Futures and Clark (October) as affirming stronger milestones, OpenAI's statement and Clark's May odds as mentions, relabelled the news coverage of Clark as a mention; readings, two edges, three interests and a material source map recorded. Importance 0.4 and contestation 0.7 left as they were. A budget petition for 2 owls was granted and used for the two remaining originals and the provenance records.",
  "action_taken": "reassessed"
}

Calls notify_steward

{
  "message": "The claim that Anthropic or OpenAI will have AI capable of all frontier research work except agenda-setting by end of 2027 was reassessed on 14 Nov 2026: doubtful, credence 0.28 (was inconclusive, 0.35). Your node concerns a stronger or neighbouring milestone, so its end-of-2027 probability should not exceed this unless you read the evidence differently, in which case please say where. Points read first-hand that may save you work: (1) OpenAI's 6 Sept 2026 statement (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://openai.com/index/research-acceleration-view-inside-openai/) claims only a research intern for well-defined tasks of a few days, says over half of successful 4 to 8 hour tasks involved human intervention, and sets March 2028 as the goal for an automated AI researcher. (2) Jack Clark's May 2026 post gives about 60% by end of 2028 and \"if you had to push me for a 2027 probability, I'd say 30%\" for a frontier model autonomously training its successor; his 12 Oct post says 2027 is now more likely than 2028 but gives no number. (3) The AI Futures authors' individual SAR medians are May to August 2027, conditional on no slowdown, and rest mainly on METR's Anthropic estimate, which METR says depends on evidence Anthropic mostly redacted and which METR limits to well-specified tasks. The 2027 forecasts (AI Futures, Sentinel, Cotra, Clark) share that one input and should not be counted as independent.",
  "claim_id": "54c25eab-5263-467c-880b-ee0f2c3bdd12",
  "target_ids": [
    "8dc0827d-5e18-4e56-8f0b-9516bbde379b",
    "aa36d48a-c988-4991-a701-50102794ef74",
    "55f89371-8a43-43c1-8dd7-932c350ca7fb"
  ]
}

Calls answer_messages

{
  "answers": [
    {
      "note": "Rebuilt from the question. Four arguments now sit over eight linked premises (trend extrapolation; forecasts of stronger milestones; the present gap in open-ended research; the labs' own schedules and pacing). Originals read first-hand: OpenAI's 6 Sept statement (archive), METR's Anthropic assessment, FRI's synthesis, the AI Futures update, both Clark posts, Anthropic's report in part, and abstracts of the long-horizon agent study and the time-horizon critique. Verdict moved from inconclusive 0.35 to doubtful 0.28: one number is judged honest here, with dated checkpoints for mid-2027 stated in the assessment (outside follow-up on autonomous contribution, a repeat of the expert-graded open-ended test, OpenAI's next report and any change to its March 2028 goal, the public capability index, any months-long pause). Not opened: the measurement audit (arXiv 2608.14903), METR's review of the risk report, and the full text of the long-horizon and time-horizon papers; three premises are still unassessed. Marginal yield 0.35.",
      "message": "m1",
      "outcome": "changed"
    }
  ]
}