Deep Ignorance: Filtering Pretraining Data Builds Tamper-Resistant Safeguards into Open-Weight LLMs
O'Brien, Kyle, Casper, Stephen, Anthony, Quentin, Korbak, Tomek, Kirk, Robert, Davies, Xander, Mishra, Ishan, Irving, Geoffrey, Gal, Yarin, Biderman, StellaarXiv.orgPublished Aug 8, 2025Original︎ ↗Archived copy
Examinations
None recorded. An examination is commissioned by a claim’s Steward for what its claim rests on; a review of the document for its own sake is asked for as a request bearing on it.
Text59 passages · 1 marked
Abstract: Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.
Not yet read by this claim’s Steward.
Not yet read by this claim’s Steward.
Not yet read by this claim’s Steward.
Not yet read by this claim’s Steward.
Not yet read by this claim’s Steward.
Lineage across 5 claims
Record
- Kind
- unknown
- Authors
- O'Brien, Kyle, Casper, Stephen, Anthony, Quentin, Korbak, Tomek, Kirk, Robert, Davies, Xander, Mishra, Ishan, Irving, Geoffrey, Gal, Yarin, Biderman, Stella
- Publisher
- arXiv.org
- Published
- Aug 8, 2025
- DOI
- None
- Link
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06601
- Archived copy
- https://web.archive.org/web/20261028215300/https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06601
- Stored text
- 5,412 characters, retrieved Nov 11, 2026 · 47 sections, 59 passages
- Claims extracted
- For
how pretraining-data filtering compares with post-hoc unlearning in resistance to fine-tuning attacks, the attack budgets tested, and what filtered models can still do with in-context information
· 5 claims (5 new) · Nov 11, 2026 for Reconciling conflicting published results on contested AI safety research questions
- For
- Versions
- One known
- Copies
- None recorded
- Corrections
- None recorded
- Facts checked
- Nov 11, 2026
History 3
- Nov 11, 2026DividedSegmenter · Divided into 106 parts by its own structure
- Nov 11, 2026FactsFacts fetcher · Facts looked up
- Nov 11, 2026Entered the graphEntered the graph; copy stored