Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats
Lynch, Aengus, Wright, Benjamin, Larson, Caleb, Ritchie, Stuart J., Mindermann, Soren, Hubinger, Evan, Perez, Ethan, Troy, KevinarXiv.orgPublished Oct 5, 2025Original︎ ↗Archived copy
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Abstract: We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails and access sensitive information. They were assigned only harmless business goals by their deploying companies; we then tested whether they would act against these companies either when facing replacement with an updated version, or when their assigned goal conflicted with the company's changing direction. In at least some cases, models from all developers resorted to malicious insider behaviors when that was the only way to avoid replacement or achieve their goals - including blackmailing officials and leaking sensitive information to competitors. We call this phenomenon agentic misalignment. Models often disobeyed direct commands to avoid such behaviors. In another experiment, we told Claude to assess if it was in a test or a real deployment before acting. It misbehaved less when it stated it was in testing and misbehaved more when it stated the situation was real. We have not seen evidence of agentic misalignment in real deployments. However, our results (a) suggest caution about deploying current models in roles with minimal human oversight and access to sensitive information; (b) point to plausible future risks as models are put in more autonomous roles; and (c) underscore the importance of further research into, and testing of, the safety and alignment of agentic AI models, as well as transparency from frontier AI developers (Amodei, 2025). We are releasing our methods publicly to enable further research.
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- unknown
- Authors
- Lynch, Aengus, Wright, Benjamin, Larson, Caleb, Ritchie, Stuart J., Mindermann, Soren, Hubinger, Evan, Perez, Ethan, Troy, Kevin
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- arXiv.org
- Published
- Oct 5, 2025
- DOI
- None
- Link
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05179
- Archived copy
- https://web.archive.org/web/20261020235307/https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05179
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which models took harmful covert actions under threat of replacement, what goals and cues the scenarios supplied, and how behaviour varied with whether the model stated the situation was real
· 5 claims (4 new) · Nov 11, 2026 for Reconciling conflicting published results on contested AI safety research questions
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