Proxy Reward Internalization and Mechanistic Exploitation: A Learned Precursor to Reward Hacking and Its Generalization
Beigi, Mohammad, Jin, Ming, Huang, LifuarXiv.orgPublished Jun 8, 2026Original︎ ↗Archived copy
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- Across coding-RL checkpoints, in-domain PRIME tracks out-of-domain misalignment.
Supports. Section 4.4 reports R squared 0.77 and Spearman 0.87 between in-domain PRIME and misalignment on the Betley et al. questions across checkpoints, with PRIME leading by about 45 steps. The authors acknowledge that a shared time trend could produce the fit, and they report no seed count or detrended analysis. Nov 11, 2026
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Abstract: Reward hacking is usually studied after it becomes visible, once a model earns high proxy reward while failing the intended task. We instead study what proxy RL teaches before that failure appears. We introduce Proxy Reward Internalization and Mechanistic Exploitation (PRIME), a learned capability to assess task correctness, predict proxy acceptance, and reason about exploitable proxy--gold gaps. In coding RL environments with exploitable pytest rewards, we measure PRIME through chain-of-thought monitoring, direct probes, and activation-level concept vectors. We find that PRIME emerges in a staged sequence before sustained reward hacking, and that its current direct-probe score forecasts later hack onset and severity even when the visible hack rate is still low. PRIME also adapts when the evaluator changes, retargeting to whichever proxy--gold gap remains rewarded and persisting when gold reward suppresses overt hacking, and ablating its activation directions reduces hacking. Across checkpoints, in-domain PRIME tracks out-of-domain misalignment. Together these results suggest that exploitable proxy RL amplifies a proxy-internalization capability upstream of visible hacking, making PRIME a candidate early-warning signal for broader alignment risk.
Supports. Section 4.4 reports R squared 0.77 and Spearman 0.87 between in-domain PRIME and misalignment on the Betley et al. questions across checkpoints, with PRIME leading by about 45 steps. The authors acknowledge that a shared time trend could produce the fit, and they report no seed count or detrended analysis.
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- Beigi, Mohammad, Jin, Ming, Huang, Lifu
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- Jun 8, 2026
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.09711
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whether unprimed coding RL with exploitable rewards produced out-of-domain misalignment, how large, and how it was measured
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whether unprimed coding RL with exploitable rewards produced out-of-domain misalignment, how large, and how it was measured
· 2 claims (0 new) · Nov 11, 2026 for Reconciling conflicting published results on contested AI safety research questions
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